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Tax Constraints on Indexed Options
David M. Schizer1
2A traditional option gives the holder the right, but not the obligation, to
purchase property for a set price called the “exercise” or “strike” price.  For
instance, an option might offer stock for the firm’s then-current share price of
$100, allowing the executive to profit from appreciation above $100.  In an
indexed option, in contrast, the exercise price fluctuates with some benchmark,
such as the Standard & Poors 500 Stock Index (“S&P 500”) or an industry basket. 
For instance, the option might entitle the executive to buy stock for 1/13 the value
of the S&P 500 (which is assumed to be 1,300 currently).  For this option to yield
a profit, the firm must outperform the S&P 500.  For instance, if the firm’s share
price doubles to $200 but the S&P 500 increases even more to 3,900, the
executive makes no profit (because the option yields the right to pay $300 for
stock worth $200).  On the other hand, if the stock declines to $80 but the S&P
500 declines even more to $650, the executive makes a $30 profit.  In basing pay
on relative performance, then, indexed options reward good performance even in a
falling market, without rewarding poor performers in a rising market.
3See Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 Bell J. Econ.
74, 82-83 (1979).
4The rarity of indexed options is well known, and has commonly been
described as a puzzle. See, e.g., Brian J. Hall and Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs
Really Paid Like Bureaucrats? 113 Q. J. Econ. 653, 683 & n. 34 (1998) (noting
that indexed options “would represent a substantial improvement over current
contracts” but are seldom used, and observing that “the near complete absence of
relative pay seems to be a puzzle.”).
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Indexed stock option grants reward executives for outperforming a
benchmark, such as the market as a whole or competitors in the same industry.2 
These options offer superior incentives by diminishing the influence of factors
beyond an executive’s control, such as general market and industry conditions.3 
Yet indexed options are almost never used.4  Prof ssor Levmore seeks to explain
this puzzle with norms.  The main point of this comment on his Article is that tax
plays a larger role in this puzzle than Professor Levmore acknowledges, although
5Tax has not previously been offered as an explanation for the indexed
option puzzle.  My focus on tax is unlikely to surprise Professor Levmore, who
says: “I can count on my commentator to pursue the tax angle and intuitions.” See
Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms, at 12 n. 19.
6See Section 162(m)(1) (“In the case of any publicly held corporation, no
deduction shall be allowed under this chapter for applicable employee
remuneration with respect to any covered employee to the extent that the amount
of such remuneration for the taxable year with respect to such employee exceeds
$1,000,000.”)  The rule applies to the chief executive officer and to the four other
most highly compensated employees.  See Section 162(m) (3) (defining “covered
employee”).  The term “applicable employee remuneration” does not include any
remuneration “payable solely on account of the attainment of one or more
performance goals” if procedural requirements are satisfied.  Section 162(m)(C).
7For the typical “nonqualified” option, the employer has a deduction, and
the employee has income when the option is exercised, based on the spread
between the exercise price and the value of the stock. See Section 83 and Treas.
(continued...)
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tax is not a complete explanation.5  Accounting and Professor Levmore’s norms-
based account are then briefly considered.
I. TAX CONSTRAINTS ON INDEXED OPTIONS
A. Section 162(m) and “Phony” Performance Pay
The main tax advantage of traditional options over indexed ones derives
from Section 162(m).  A product of populist concerns about soaring executive
pay, this rule disallows a publicly-traded firm’s deduction for compensation
exceeding one million dollars.  Yet the rule exempts performance-based pay.6  The
goal of this exception is either to encourage such pay or, a cynic might say, to
render the measure toothless.  Both traditional and indexed options qualify as
performance-based, and so the deduction for either type of option is not limited.7  
7(...continued)
Reg. 1.83-7.  However, the taxable event is the grant date if the option has a
“readily ascertainable fair market value,” a condition that the regulations render
extremely rare.  “Incentive stock options” are subject to different rules, which are
discussed below in Part I.B.
8As Professors Johnson and Tiang have shown, a single traditional option is
worth three times as much as a single indexed option on plausible assumptions.
See Shane A. Johnson and Yisong S. Tiang, The Value and Incentive Effects of
Nontraditional Executive Stock Option Plans, 57 J. Fin. Econ. 3 (2000) (an
indexed option is worth $13.56 and a traditional option is worth $40.35, assuming
an at the money exercise price of $100, volatility of .20, and a risk-free rate of 8%,
and a dividend yield of 2%).  The difference between the two is the bet on the
market as a whole.  Indeed, a traditional option is comparable to an indexed option
paired with an option on the market as a whole.  For instance, assume that the
traditional option authorizes purchase of the stock for $1300 (the current price). 
A similar economic return is also offered by two securities: an indexed option
entitling the executive to buy stock for the current value of the S&P 500 (which is
currently $1300); and an option to buy the S&P for $1300.  To make the two
alternatives perfectly equivalent, a “knock out” feature should be added to the
indexed option, such that it makes no payment when the S&P option is out of the
money.  In addition, loss on the indexed option would have to be “netted” against
gains on the S&P option in some cases.  For a discussion of this netting effect, see
infra note 17.
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However, a traditional option includes value that is not really performance
based, but is treated as such for tax purposes.  In particular, traditional options
include a bet on the market as a whole.8  For example, the option might give an
executive the right to buy stock for the current price of $100.  If the stock
appreciates to $110, the executive earns ten dollars – even if the rest of the market
doubles, so that a 10% return is not impressive.  With a traditional option, even
poor performers profit in a bull market.  In contrast, an indexed option does not
offer this windfall: executives are rewarded only for outperforming the benchmark
(e.g., competitors or the market as a whole).  Thus, while traditional and indexed
options both contain a firm-specific bet, traditional options alsoinclude a valuable
9The regulations and conference report treat options as “performance
based,” without requiring indexation.  See Treas. Reg. 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi) and
examples 9 through 11; see also Conference Committee Report, reported in CCH
Federal Tax Reporter, at 21,82.  The exercise price must be no less than the stock
price on the grant date.  See Treas. Reg. 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi) and examples 9
through 11.  Cf. Marvin A. Chirelstein, Federal Income Taxation (7th ed. 1994)
(legislative history of Section 162(m) “apparently regards `performance’ as an
absolute rather than a comparative measure of executive success”).  
10Recent empirical studies confirm that firms respect the $ 1 million cap. 
For instance, one study of 376 firms documented that most responded to
enactment of Section 162(m) by qualifying top executive pay as performance
related.  Peter Woodlock & Joseph W. Antenucci, Update: Corporate Responses
to Executive Compensation Deductibility Limits, Tax Notes, oct. 13, 1997, at 221. 
See also Todd Perry & Marc Zener, Pay for Performance?  Government
Regulation and the Structure of Compensation Contracts (June 2000) (unpublished
manuscript posted on SSRN) (“[W]e find that after 1993 the salary growth rate is
significantly smaller for firms near or above the million-dollar threshold.  We also
find that most firms reducing salaries to a level at or below one million dollars do
so in response to 162(m).  On the other hand, these salary reductions do not lead
to lower total compensation.”); Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram, Regulating
Executive Pay: Using the Tax Code to Influence CEO Compensation (MIT
Working paper 00-24) (September 2000) (unpublished manuscript available on
SSRN) (finding that cash salaries cluster around $1 million, with growth in
compensation concentrated in option grants and other performance based
payments); Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive
Compensation, NBER Working Paper 7596 (March 2000) (“We did find that the
million dollar rule led companies to substitute performance-based pay for salary. 
But our evidence suggests that this substitution was quite modest . . . .”). 
Preserving the deduction under Section 162(m) reportedly has public relations
benefits, as well as tax benefits.  See Perry & Zener, supra, at 8 (citing survey by
(continued...)
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market bet that is not really performance based, but still qualifies as such for tax
purposes.9  
1. Nonperformance Pay in Disguise: Three Pay Packages
As an illustration of this point, three alternative pay packages are
considered for an executive whose market value is $10 million per year.  To
preserve its tax deduction, the firm cannot offer more than $1 million in cash.10 
10(...continued)
Investor’s Business Daily which indicates that 87% of firms surveyed intended to
implement Section 162(m)-related changes for positive shareholder relations).
11 The firm could also include a performance-based bonus, but this
alternative is ignored for simplicity’s sake.  As discussed below, for the bonus to
qualify as performance-based, it must also present real firm-specific risk.
12As Professors Johnson and Tiang have shown, the indexed option grant
will be almost twice as sensitive to changes in the stock price as a traditional grant
of equivalent value.  See Johnson & Tiang, supra note 8, at (delta of indexed grant
is 93% larger than delta of traditional grant). 
5
Thus, the remaining $9 million -- or 90% of the pay package -- must be offered
through options, which could be indexed or traditional.11  
Traditional options have two potential advantages.  First, $9 million of
traditional options conveys far less firm-specific risk than $9 million of indexed
options – indeed, about half as much, since traditional options also include a
valuable market bet.12  Of course, some firm-specific risk is needed to produce
useful incentives.  Yet if too much is imposed, undiversified executives could
13Executives are undiversified because their human capital is tied to firm
performance.  The size of the premium will depend upon their risk preferences and
the rest of the executive’s portfolio.  Too much risk is imposed if the premium
rises more than the added productivity benefits from intensifying the incentive. 
See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Optimal Exercise prices for Executive Stock
Options, AEA Papers and Proceedings 209 (2000); see also Lisa K. Meulbroek,
The Efficiency of Equity-Linked Compensation: Understanding the Full Cost of
Awarding Executive Stock Options (undiversified executive’s subjective valuation
of equity compensation will be lower than diversified investor’s valuation, leading
to deadweight loss when such compensation is used).  In response, executives
theoretically could seek diversification in the derivatives market.  If such hedging
with derivatives is feasible, the firm should not pay a premium for accepting firm-
specific risk and, of course, no useful incentives would be created.  Yet tax and
securities law impede such hedging, as should contractual limitations imposed by
the firm.  See David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal
Foundation of Incentive Compatibility, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 440 (2000).
14As Professor Levmore notes, indexed options encourage executives to
take risk, even more than traditional options do. Risk-promoting compensation is
helpful in some cases, since executives tend to be more risk averse than diversified
shareholders.  Yet too much promotion of risk could lead to risks with negative
present value.
15See Levmore, supra note 5, at 26 n. 54 (noting that incentive
compatibility of traditional options can be replicated through cash and indexed
options).  This package has the advantage of filtering out unwanted market risk
and providing useful incentives even in a bear market.
16Loss of $4.5 million dollar deduction would cost the firm $1.575 million,
(continued...)
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demand an unduly high premium.13  Second, as Professor Levmore emphasizes,
too much firm-specific risk could induce the executive to take foolish gambles.14  
If the point is to reduce the level of firm-specific risk, traditional options
are not the only way.  Instead, the firm could offer a smaller gr nt of indexed
options (e.g., $4.5 million) and more cash (e.g., $5.5 million).15  Yet because of
Section 162(m), the firm could not deduct $4.5 million of cash, and thus would
owe an extra $1.5 million of tax.16
16(...continued)
assuming the 35% federal corporate tax rate applies.
17Even those who want market risk would rather get it by investing cash
salary in S&P options.  If this market bet is embedded in a traditional option,
profits can be offset by firm-specific losses.  Yet such “netting” would not occur if
the executive received S&P options (or cash used to purchase them) and separate
indexed options.  To see the difference, compare two scenarios.  First, assume the
executive receives a traditional option to buy stock for its current market price of
$1300 (which is also the current value of the S&P 500).  What if the firm stock
price remains at $1300, even though the S&P 500 increases to $2300?  The
executive has no profit. In contrast, assume the executive receives an indexed
option to buy stock for the current value of the S&P, and also uses cash to buy a
separate at-the-money S&P call option with an exercise price of $1300.  On the
assumed facts, the executive nets a $1000 profit on the S&P option.  Even though
the stock underperformed the S&P by $1000, the executive has no loss on the
option (other than the salary foregone to get it).  Unlike in the traditional option,
this $1000 underperformance does not cancel out the $1000 profit on the S&P
option. 
18In addition, the return on the underlying stock, and thus on the traditional
option, should already include a premium for market risk.  Thus, an extra premium
is more likely to be demanded for firm-specific risk (which cannot be diversified
(continued...)
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The tax appeal of traditional options, then, is that they allow a reduction in
firm-specific risk (and thus in performance pay) while still preserving the firm’s
deduction.  Even so, these options impose two offsetting costs: First, the executive
must bear general market risk.17 In addition, these options provide less effective
incentives in a falling market, a factor that may prove increasingly important in
coming years.  To compensate the executive for these costs, the firm must share
some of the $1.575 million of tax savings.  For instance, the grant can be increased
from $9 million to $10 million.  In some cases, a relatively modest premium will
suffice.  Market risk in the options is acceptable if the executive would have
invested in the market anyway.18  Likewise, the risk of being undercompensated in
18(...continued)
away).    See Meulbroek, supra note 13 (emphasizing “loss of diversification cost”
associated with firm-specific risk).
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a falling market is less daunting if executives expect to be made whole ex poste,
for instance, through repricing of existing grants or larger future ones.  The three
pay packages are compared in the following Table:
TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF THREE PAY PACKAGES
Pay Package Firm-Specific Risk Nondeductible Portion
$1 million cash
$9 million indexed option
Intense concentration0
$1 million cash
$9 million traditional option
Less intense 0
$5.5 million cash
$4.5 million indexed option
Less intense (like $9
million traditional
option)
$4.5 million cash
2. Section 162(m) Cannot Be The Whole Story
Thus, Section 162(m) inadvertently favors traditional options over indexed
ones – a distortion that justifies repeal of this measure.  Even so, Section 162(m) is
only a partial explanation. Indexed options were rare before this rule was enacted
in 1993.  In some cases, the tax benefit to the firm may be less than the nontax cost
to the executive (e.g., extra market risk in a bear market).  Moreover, the rule
19On the other hand, the deduction from options comes in future tax years
(i.e., when options are exercised) and so a firm may be less certain, ex ante, of
being in a low bracket.
20See, e.g., 1-162-27(e)(2)(i) (pay is not performance based unless
performance goal “outcome is substantially uncertain at the time the compensation
committee actually establishes the goal”).
21Professor Calvin Johnson has observed a tax inefficiency in any option
that is settled with stock (whether traditional or indexed): After the option is
exercised, the executive will hold stock; unlike debt, stock generates no deductions
to the firm.  See  Calvin  H.  Johnson, Stock Compensation: The Most  Expensive 
Way to Pay Future Cash, 52 S.M.U. L. Rev. 423, 442 (1999).   Yet this problem is
fixed if, at the same time, the firm borrows to repurchase shares from investors.  In
fact, firms commonly hedge option grants with such leveraged equity repurchases. 
Cf. Haim A. Mozes & Steven B. Raymar, Granting and Hedging Employee Stock
Options: A Tax Motivation and Empirical Tests (unpublished manuscript posted
on SSRN).  The result is essentially the same as if the firm borrowed money to pay
executives in cash (e.g., on an indexed stock appreciation right), which is the
approach Professor Johnson recommends.
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should have less influence for firms that are subject to a low tax rate.19  In addition,
Section 162(m) cannot explain why less senior executives (not subject to the rule)
receive traditional instead of indexed grants.  Finally, other compensation is not
entirely performance-based, but still qualifies as such under Section 162(m).  For
instance, cash bonuses could be based on lax “performance” standards (e.g., sales
of at least 80% of last year’s volume).  A problem with this alternative, though, is
that the rule requires a meaningful chance of failing the standard.20  Yet such isk is
precisely what the parties may be trying to avoid.21
B. Indexing Incentive Stock Options
A second tax constraint is that so-called incentive stock options (“ISOs”)
arguably cannot be indexed.  ISOs offer capital gain treatment to the executive,
22Specifically, the executive owes no tax upon exercising the option and
will report capital gain from selling the stock as long as the stock is held at least
one year from the date of exercise and two years from the option grant date. 
Exercise of the option can trigger alternative minimum tax, though.  See Barbara J.
Raasch & Judith L. Rowland, Stock Option Planning, 77 Taxes 39
23See Section 422(b)(4).
24For instance, assume that the stock is worth $100, the S&P 500 is at
$1,300, and the option’s exercise price is 1/13 of the S&P 500.  Under this reading
of the statutory language, the option could be an ISO.  Professor Levmore
apparently reads the language in this way.  See Levmore, supra note 5, at 10.
25See Treas. Reg. 1.421-7(e)(1) (defining option price as “the consideration
in money or other property which, pursuant to the terms of the option, is the price
at which the stock subject to the option is purchased”) (emphasis added).
26Prop. Treas. Reg. 1.422A-2(e) (emphasis added).
27In defense of indexed options, one might read this language to require
(continued...)
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albeit at the cost of no deduction for the issuer.22   For the option to qualify as an
ISO, the “option price” must not be “not less than the fair market value of the
stock at the date such option is granted.”23  This language can plausibly be read as
permitting indexed options as long as, on the grant date, the index is at least as
valuable as the stock price.24  However, meeting this test on the grant date is not
sufficient under the regulations: The “option price” -- which is defined as the price
actually paid on the option25 – “may be determined in any manner so long as the
minimum price possible under the terms of the option cannot be less than the fair
market value of the stock at the date of grant.”26  An indexed option cannot satisfy
this condition because the exercise price on an indexed option could fall below this
minimum value at some point during the life of the option (e.g., as the index
falls).27
27(...continued)
only that the minimum price, as of the grant date, cannot be less than the fair
market value of the stock on the grant date.  In other words, one could read the
phrase “on the grant date” to refer to the entire sentence, and not just the
immediately proceeding language “fair market value of the stock.”  Yet this
reading inconsistent with the definition of “option price” as the price actually paid
(and not the price that hypothetically would be paid on the grant date).   See
Treas. Reg. 1.421-7(e)(1).  In addition, this reading yields bizarre results.  What if
the exercise price is equals the stock price on the grant date but is preset to decline
thereafter (e.g., by a dollar a day until it reaches zero)?  Tested on the grant date,
this option would qualify as an ISO.  Yet this is precisely the kind of option that is
not supposed to qualify.  Indeed, the predecessor regime for “restricted stock
options” explicitly required that “the option price must be fixed or determinable at
the time the option is granted” and generally disallowed “variable price options.” 
See 1.421-1(d)(2).
28See Myron Scholes & Mark A. Wolfson, Taxes and Business Strategy
(1992).
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Even so, the significance of this tax constraint on indexed ISOs should not
be overemphasized.  The statutory language arguably permits ISOs to be indexed,
and there is no policy reason to disfavor indexation.  As a result, the Treasury
should be willing to change the regulation.  Yet to my knowledge, no one is
lobbying for this reform.  Stakes are low, in any event, because ISOs are relatively
uncommon.  The tax savings to the executive (i.e., the maximum tax bracket of
39.6% minus the long term capital gains rate of 20%, or 19.6%) is usually less
than the tax cost to the employer (35%).28  As a result, these options are tax-
advantaged only for firms in low tax brackets.  (Note, though, that these are
precisely the firms that would be less influenced by Section 162(m)).  Even in this
29The underlying shares, in aggregate, cannot be worth more than $100,000
in a given year.
30Thus, no expense is recorded in the body of the income statement when
the option is granted or exercised.  Traditional options qualify for this treatment
only if the exercise price is at least as high as the stock price on the grant date. 
Under a 1995 reform, the option’s grant date value (but not subsequent changes in
value) must now be reflected in a footnote on the income statement.  In contrast,
because indexed options are treated as “variable” options, their expense is
essentially marked-to-market in the body of the income statement.
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context, the size of ISO grants is strictly limited.29  Thus, the need to qualify for
ISO status is at most a partial explanation for the scarcity of indexed options.
II. ACCOUNTING
The conventional view is that financial accounting favors traditional
options by not expensing them on the firm’s income statement.30  Prof ssor
Levmore questions the importance of this accounting difference.  Investors in an
efficient market should ignore accounting conventions, he notes, and thus should
prefer a better incentive to padded earnings. 
On the other hand, when the Financial Accounting Standards Board
recently sought to expense option grants, firms hired lobbyists and spent political
capital to preserve the accounting treatment.  Real resources are also devoted in
31For instance, firms spend real resources to issue (tax deductible) debt that
will be treated as equity for accounting purposes.  See e.g., Ellen Engel et al.,
Debt-Hybrid Securities, 37 J. Accounting Res. 249 (1999) (studying MIPS and
other securities treated as debt for tax purposes but not for rating agency and
accounting purposes; noting that firms incur extra expenses totaling approximately
4% of offering price, or $10 million, to secure better accounting treatment for
otherwise comparable securities).  Likewise, firms have stopped engaging in
certain hedging transactions because such transactions would introduce volatility in
their accounting earnings under the new accounting rule for derivatives, FAS 133. 
See David Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning (unpublished
manuscript on file with author).  See also Douglas A Shackelford & Terry Shevlin,
Empirical Tax Research in Accounting, J. Accounting & Econ. (forthcoming 2000) 
(describing studies of tradeoff between accounting and tax reduction in use of
LIFO, compensation, depreciation, income shifting, capital structure, acquisitions,
etc.).
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other contexts to enhance earnings.31   If accounting really has no significance, as
academics often suggest, why the fuss?  
Since sophisticated parties often behave as if accounting is significant, it is
worth considering reasons why they may be correct.  First, information can be
costly.  To measure the true cost of options, investors must value them not only on
the grant date, but also over time (i.e., information the accounting statements do
not supply).  Periodic revaluations are costly.  Indeed, economists have been
reluctant to undertake this effort in a related context: Studies of the link between
pay and performance usually ignore post-grant-date fluctuations in the value of
32A notable recent exception is the insightful study by Brian Hall and
Jeffrey Liebman.  As they put it, “[i]t is worth stating from the outset why our
results differ from previous findings.  With regard to the large literature that
indicates that salary and bonus elasticities are small, our findings differ simply
because previous estimates ignored changes in the value of stock and stock
options, which account for virtually all of the sensitivity.”  See Hall & Liebman,
supra note 4, at 655.
33A short sale is a bet that the market will decline.  The short seller sells
borrowed property, hoping to buy it later for a lower price.
34An analogy may be drawn to the “noise trader” literature.  The existence
of speculative bubbles or panics is puzzling in an efficient market.  Instead, we
would expect sophisticated investors to arbitrage these price swings. For instance,
if unsophisticated investors (or “noise” traders) are paying too much for tulips or
Internet stocks, sophisticated investors should engage in short sales that yield a
profit once the bubble bursts and, indeed, should help it to burst.  Why, then, do
bubbles ever occur? The “noise trader” literature contends that sophisticated
investors will do these short sales only if they expect the market to decline in the
near term.  If there is doubt about when (or whether) the noise traders will
recognize their error, arbitrage becomes very risky, and less of this service is
(continued...)
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equity compensation.32  Since economists find these computations daunting, it
would not be surprising if investors do as well.
Of course, some investors should be willing to bear this cost if they could
profit from superior information.  For instance, assume that unsophisticated
investors, misled by accounting conventions, bid up the price of a given security. 
In a well functioning market, sophisticated investors, who have done enough
research not to be fooled, should do short sales that return the price to an
appropriate level.33  Yet sophisticated investors will not take this step unless they
expect the rest of the market, eventually, to follow them.  If they expect
unsophisticated investors to continue to rely on accounting numbers, less arbitrage
will be supplied.34   
34(...continued)
supplied.   See generally J.  Bradford  De Long,  et al., The Size and Incidence of
the Losses from Noise Trading, 44 J. Fin. 681 (1989); J. Bradford  De Long,  et
al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 703 (1990); Andrei
Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, J.
Econ. Persp., Spring 1990, at 19.
35For one thing, we might expect firms that are less concerned about
accounting to implement indexed options.  For instance, cable firms are said to be
evaluated based on the number of subscribers, rather than on accounting earnings. 
Yet to my knowledge cable firms have not rushed to implement indexed options.
15
This is not to say that accounting alone explains the lack of indexed
options, although the role of accounting warrants further study.35  I agree with
Professor Levmore that it is useful also to seek explanations more consistent with
a well-functioning market.
III. NONCONFLICTING FORTUNES
Professor Levmore offers a two-step argument.  First, indexed options are
not appropriate for all executives.  His reason is that these options can induce
excessive risk-taking and thus can be given only to executives who are readily
monitored.  (As a friendly amendment, he might add that Section 162(m)
discourages indexed grants to some highly compensated executives.)  Second, a
firm will resist giving indexed options to a subset of executives.  The problem, he
argues, is that pay of different employees could be negatively correlated, violating
the norm of “nonconflicting fortunes.”  In a falling market, for instance, indexed
option holders could prosper.  Yet colleagues holding traditional options would
not.
36Professor Levmore acknowledges this point.  See Levmore, supra note 5,
at 25 n. 52.
37See Marcel Kahan, Economics and Law, Networks and Norms: An
Analysis of the Incentive Structure of the Corporation 77.
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While this argument has much to commend it, two concerns come to mind. 
First, are negative correlations in pay as rare as he suggests?  For instance,
employees often compete for the same promotion.36  Likewise, division-heads may
be paid for division-specific performance, with one division doing well while others
do not.  Second, is this really a norms story?  Instead, as Professor Levmore
acknowledges, straightforward efficiency concerns may be at work.  In avoiding
negative correlations in pay, the firm may simply be building team morale and
avoiding inter-employee conflict.
The more general point is that, in designing compensation packages, firms
consider factors other than the two – incentives and employee risk-aversion –
emphasized in the finance literature on indexed options.  For instance, it may be
helpful to explain the CEO’s large pay package by saying it is performance-based,
even if this is not entirely the case.  Thus, the ability of traditional options to offer
nonperformance pay “in disguise” — a feature with tax advantages, as discussed
above — may also facilitate dealings with unions, regulators, and even
shareholders, although sophisticated investors should not be fooled.  In addition,
as Professor Kahan notes, compensation committees may not want to be the first
to adopt a novel method of compensation because of “conformity” norms.37 
Furthermore, indexation raises the choice of a suitable benchmark.  If the executive
38Cf. Paul A. Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle (1999)
(noting that when venture capitalists are evaluated on a relative basis, they may
respond by imitating each other’s portfolios to avoid falling behind).
39Professors Aggarwal and Samwick take the point one step further.  They
argue that collusion among rival firms can advance shareholder (although not
societal) interests.  Indexed options are avoided because they would impede such
collusion.  See Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, Executive
Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation:
Theory and Evidence, 6 J. Fin. 1999 (1999).  Yet this theory bears only on the
choice not to index against industry competitors.  The theory does not explain the
absence of indexation against the market as a whole.
40Beta describes the sensitivity of a stock to general movements in the
market.  Stocks with high betas are very sensitive, and thus go up (and down)
(continued...)
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must outperform competitors, which ones?  What if the firm is a conglomerate? 
What about competitors that are not publicly traded?  If the benchmark is a
particular industry, instead of the market as a whole, executives have incentive to
imitate38 or scuttle competitors, even if these efforts do not advance their own
shareholders’ interests.39  Likewise, if the industry is the benchmark, the executive
is not credited (or penalized) for the choice of which industry the firm should be in. 
For instance, a typewriter manufacturer might outperform other typewriter
manufacturers, but managers arguably should be penalized for failing to sell
computers.  On the other hand, if the benchmark is the entire market, managers
would be rewarded (or penalized) for being in a “hot” (or “dead”) sector, a result
driven in part by luck.  In addition, managers in high “beta” firms could profit in a
rising market (i.e., as the stock predictably rises more than the general market),
while managers in low beta firms would profit in a falling market (i.e., as the stock
predictably falls le s than the market).40
40(...continued)
more than the general market.
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More generally, the appeal of indexed options is not as straightforward as
the finance literature suggests.  Professor Levmore makes this case elegantly and
persuasively.  Norms may play a role, along with accounting, a range of
governance concerns, and the tax constraints emphasized here.  
